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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, § 78-2-2, and authority to assign this case to the Court of Appeals pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2-2(4). This Court received this case by transfer from the 
Supreme Court on December 23, 1998, and has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the judgment entered without notice to Richard A. Christenson should 
be set aside for lack of in personam jurisdiction? 
The standard of review on this issue is correctness: 
Because Rule 4 (of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) governs service of process,... 
and because whether service of process was proper is a jurisdictional issue, the 
standard of review is a correction-of-error standard: 
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) is ordinarily 
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. However, when a motion to vacate 
a judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no 
discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without 
denying due process to the one against whom it runs. Therefore, the propriety 
of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate, 
becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the district court. 
Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768 at 771 (Utah App. 1997); citing, State 
Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. VijiU 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah l9S9)(citations omitted) 
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2. Whether the failure to give notice of the summary judgment motion deprived 
Richard A. Christenson of due process? 
The standard of review on this issue is correctness. (Id.) 
3. Whether a judgment entered against "Christensen" affects the rights of Richard 
A. Christenson? 
The standard of review on this issue is correctness. (Id.) 
APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL 
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Copy of the Rule is included in 
the Appendix to this brief.) ^ i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal concerns the propriety of a judgment entered in 1984 by the Third 
District Court in a foreclosure case. The Plaintiff-Appellant is Mr. Richard A. Christenson. 
Richard A. Christenson was not properly served or named in the case below. He was 
never served with a summons and complaint in this case, and consequently never appeared 
in the court below. His name is spelled differently than the pleadings of the case below. < 
2 
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Despite the non-appearance of Mr. Christenson, a summary judgment was entered. 
The summary judgment motion was also not served on Mr. Christenson1. The motion was 
granted. The judgment entered purports to foreclose the interests of "all defendants" 
without regard to whether Mr. Christenson had been properly brought into the action or not. 
Although Mr. Christenson was unaware of the judgment in 1984, in a subsequent 
proceeding before the Third District Court, this old case has been asserted as a defense. 
That subsequent proceeding involved Mr. Christenson and the parties Michel. Because the 
judgment was asserted by Michels as a defense in 1998, a motion was filed in this case to 
vacate the 1984 judgment due to lack of jurisdiction. The motion was unopposed by any of 
the named parties and was granted by the lower court. 
After the motion to vacate the judgment was granted, the parties Michael moved to 
intervene and asked that the judgment be reinstated. Michels were allowed to intervene. 
The judgment was reinstated. This appeal follows. 
The questions raised by this appeal deal with the propriety of the entry of the 
judgment in the first place and whether the interests of Mr. Christenson were effectively 
dealt with under the requirements of jurisdiction and due process. 
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows: 
2In fact, none of the pleadings, discovery or motions were served on Mr. 
Christenson. 
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1. Mr. Richard A. Christenson was not properly served in this case. There is no 
return of service in the case file evidencing service of process upon Mr. Christenson. (See 
case file record. None of the documents in the record of this case include a return of service, 
and none of the documents containing a certificate of mailing include Mr. Christenson as 
arecipient.) 
2. Mr. Richard A. Christenson was not properly named as a party, since the 
named Defendant is spelled Richard A. "Christensen". (See, e.g. Record on Appeal, pages 
1, 116.) 
3. None of the documents, including the Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
Summary Judgment Order were sent, served, or otherwise provided to Mr. Richard A. , 
Christenson. (See, e.g. Record on Appeal pages 37, 111, 113 and 117.) 
4. Mr., Christenson was not aware of the existence of this lawsuit or the judgment 
entered in the lawsuit until very recently, when its existence was asserted in a different 
matter, i.e., a defense to claims of Mr. Christenson's against certain property in the City of 
Draper. (See, e.g. Record on Appeal, page 139.) 
5. The lower court was asked to vacate the judgment in this case due to lack of in 
personal jurisdiction. (See, Record on Appeal, pages 136 - 142.) < 
6. That motion was granted and the judgment was vacated. (See, Record on 
Appeal, pages 148 - 149.) 
i 
4 
7. Parties Michel moved to intervene in this case and were granted leave to 
intervene. (See, Record on Appeal, pages 156 - 163 and pages 324 - 325.) 
8. Parties Michel opposed the vacation of the judgment and asked that it be 
reinstated. (See, Record on Appeal, pages 156 - 163.) 
9. The lower court reinstated the judgment. (See, Record on Appeal, pages 326 -
329.) 
10. This appeal followed and was timely filed. (See, Record on Appeal, pages 332-
334.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In 1984, the Third District Court entered Summary Judgment in a judicial foreclosure 
action against various defendants, including one Richard "Christenson". In 1994 Richard 
A. "Christensen" brought an action to quiet title to certain real property which had not been 
foreclosed upon but which had a large number of potential claimants. 
Defendants/Intervenors/Appellees Michel sought to have that 1984 judgment against 
"Christensen" used as a defense against Mr. Christenson's quiet title action. Based upon the 
arguments of Michels, Christenson filed a motion to vacate the earlier judgment. That 
motion was granted and the judgment in this case vacated. Michels then moved to intervene 
and asked that the earlier judgment be reinstated by the lower court. The lower court then 
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reinstated the judgment. That action was, at least, ambiguous, and as to Mr. Christenson, 
improper.
 t. 
The impropriety stems from both lack of applicability of the judgment to Mr. 
Christenson and voidness. The identity of the named parties to the earlier action and the 
identity of the appellant here are facially different. The second 'applicability' problem with 
the reinstatement decision here is that, assuming, arguendo, that the 1981 "Christensen" is 
the same as the present "Christenson," the record of the earlier case shows conclusively that 
no service of any kind was ever obtained upon the "Christensen" defendant in the earlier 
action. Since there was no service in the earlier action, there was no due process as to 
appellant here and he cannot be bound thereby.
 ( 
The second general category of impropriety of the lower court decision reinstating 
the 1984 judgment is that judgment is void ab initio. That voidness exists for at least three 
reasons; (1) there was no due process; (2) there was no in personam jurisdiction, and (3) the 
judgment had expired. This reason for reversing the lower court decision requires reversal 
even if the 'applicability' issues are resolved in favor of sustaining the lower court's action 
here.
 v , ,.n... < :,t 
ARGUMENTS < 
I. The judgment entered without notice to Richard A. Christenson should 
be set aside for lack of in personam jurisdiction. 
i 
Fundamental to the validity of any judgment rendered against an individual is that the 
court have personal jurisdiction over that individual. Personal jurisdiction could have been 
established via routine service of process upon Mr. Christenson. That was not done, and as 
a result, the court never had jurisdiction over Mr. Christenson. As recently set forth: 
Because Rule 4 (of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) governs service of 
process, ... and because whether service of process was proper is a 
jurisdictional issue, the standard of review is a correction-of-error standard: 
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) is ordinarily 
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. However, when a motion to vacate 
a judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no 
discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without 
denying due process to the one against whom it runs. Therefore, the propriety 
of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate, 
becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the district court. 
Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768 at 771 (Utah App. 1997); citing, State Dep't of 
Soc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130,1132 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). Mr. Christenson's 
objection to the ex parte judgment against him is jurisdictional, and the Court has no 
discretion but to vacate the earlier decision. 
We are not dealing with an innocuous mistake, but rather a serious error which goes 
to the fundamental rights of Mr. Christenson. For whatever reason, Mr. Christenson was not 
hailed into court in 1981, and his rights cannot be affected by the outcome of the proceeding 
to which he was not a party. The intervenors below inserted the rhetorical query at one point 
in their memoranda attempting to support the ex parte judgment, "[i]s it reasonable to 
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believe that Judge Dee would have signed an Order binding all defendants if some of the 
defendants had not been served?" The answer to this rhetorical question is "Of course it is 
reasonable." It happened. The "Judgment" was not prepared by Judge Dee. It was authored 
by an attorney for one of the parties in that earlier action, Mr. Richard H. Nebeker, and 
signed by Judge Dee. The language was understandably overreaching. No one caught it at 
the time. But clearly the language was inartfully over-broad. The answers to the other 
rhetorical questions posed by Intervenors are equally apparent when one looks at the record. 
The judgment against Mr. "Christensen" is void as to Mr. Christenson. It should be 
vacated. It is fundamental to due process that a party be served process and have an 
opportunity to be heard before a judgment be entered against him. As stated in 62B Am Jur 
2d, Process: ^ 
§6. Effect of omission of service of process. 
One who is not served with process does not have the 
status of a party to the proceeding. The parties and their case 
must be brought before the court, and this is accomplished by 
the use of process. 
A judgment against one who was not given notice in the 
(. manner required by law of the action or proceeding in which 
such judgment was rendered lacks all the attributes of a judicial 
determination; it is judicial usurpation and oppression, and can 
never be upheld where justice is fairly administered. A 
judgment lacking lawful service of process is void unless 
service is waived by appearance or otherwise, and this is true 
regardless of whether the defendant had actual knowledge of 
the proceedings. A judgment is subject to collateral attack 
where it is rendered against one who was never legally served 
with process of the court. 
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The Summary Judgment Order entered in the case in 1984 was sloppily drafted and 
refers generally and broadly to "all right, title and interest of all the Defendants" rather than 
referring to only those Defendants who had been properly served and brought into the 
action. Although the judgment should be read to refer only to those who are properly 
named, properly spelled (i.e., identified), and properly served with process, the broad 
language of the judgment could arguably reach even the interests of the non-served 
Defendant "Christensen". 
Although Mr. Christenson has a differently spelled last name, the parties Michel are 
asserting that the judgement reaches the interests of Mr. Christenson. Since Mr. Christenson 
was not brought into the case, never given an opportunity to know of its existence, not sent 
a copy of the Motion for Summary Judgment, not given a copy of the Summary Judgment 
at the time it was entered, and not otherwise made aware or brought into this case at any 
time, the judgment cannot affect the interests of Mr. Christenson. As to Mr. Christenson's 
interest, this judgment was properly vacated by the lower court. The decision to reinstate 
the judgment was improper. 
The Intervenors Michel offered no opposing facts nor any fact-based objections to 
the lower court. They merely offered hyperbole and argument. That was no basis to reinstate 
the judgment. 
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Intervenors assert that the interests of all named defendants in the 1981 action were 
"barred and forever foreclosed." However, Christenson was not a named defendant in the 
1981 action. Accordingly, his interest in the real property was not extinguished. Even so, 
being "named" does not alone allow the court to acquire jurisdiction. One must be both 
"named" and "served" with process. There was no service on Mr. Christenson. 
Christenson based his motion to vacate upon fatally defective service of process (i.e., 
he was never served with process). In interpreting Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the courts have held, "[b]ut where the judgment is void because of a fatally 
defective service of process, the time limitations of Rule 60(b) have no application." Garcia 
v. Garcia, 111 P.2d 288 at 290 (Utah 1986); see also, Woody v. Rhodes, 461 P.2d 465 
(1969). The three month statute of limitations defense raised by Intervenors in their 
arguments belowr is not applicable } 
2Intervenors correctly point in their arguments to the amendment Rule 60(b) has 
undergone, and that subsection (4) of the old rule dealt with ineffective personal service. 
But, it is clear that when courts interpreted this old provision, they have always refrained 
from denying a party due process and a right to be heard based upon an inane and 
completely arbitrary time limit. Under the rule proposed by intervenors Michel, the 
original rule could have set the statutory time limit at 1 month, or 6 months, or 1 year, 
while having the same effect of denying individuals their Constitutional right to a 
hearing. The courts of Utah, as shown in the cases cited above, have been loathe to do 
the very thing Intervenors asked of the lower Court. Intervenors relies upon Lincoln 
Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. D. T. Southern Properties for the proposition that courts 
should "very cautiously" disregard the three month limitation period. Lincoln dealt with 
an appeal based upon excusable neglect, in which the moving party was served, he just 
failed to respond,, That is not the case here. 
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A, Christensoo of due process 
In order to preserve judicial resources and reach auuia^, there is a presumption that 
judgments are valid. However, this is only a presumption ,nJ one ihat can be overcome 
with appropriate proof offered b> a challenging party. - iic;. ."<.* J
 f •,: Dee entered judgment, 
belief was wrong. On the other hand, he may have understood "all" defendants to refer only 
to those over whom he had jurisdiction, and not Mr. "Cliristensen " He may also have not 
carefully considered the language, and relied upon the attorneys in that earlier action to bring 
to speculate and ask their speculation to be accepted by the Court as a basis for "reinstating" 
an otherwise void or inapplicable judgment in this case. 
- We are also coiuidei u p P; « tarnation presented in the Motion t~ V,ic~^ ! i 
would have taken steps necessary to insure that Mr. Christenson was either relieved of the 
judgment or else properly sei v ed and fcrrought into the ! OS S action before entry of any 
judgment was issued wl licl 1 n light affect 1 tini. J .' • 
presented than the underlv i P <: 'ase file? Both sides, as well as the lower Coi irt, 1 ia\ e 1: lad tl le 
] ] 
opportunity to examine it. From the file it is apparent that if the Mr. Christenson who is a 
party to this action was intended to be a party in the earlier suit, he was not properly named 
in the suit due to the misspelling of his last name. 
Along with valuing finality in judgments, courts must also value accuracy, proper 
procedure, due process and exactitude. These were all missing from the 1981 action. The 
file in this case shows Mr. Christenson was never served with process in the 1981 action and 
never filed an answer in the 1981 action. Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 
that a "civil action is commenced (1) by filing a complaint with the court, [with appropriate 
and timely service within 120 days under Rule 4(b)] or (2) by service of a summons 
together with a copy of the complaint in accordance with Rule 4." (Emphasis added.) The 
requirements of Rule 3 and 4 were not met, and the action effectively did not even 
commence as to Mr. Christenson. The 1981 action is void as to Mr. Christenson. 
From the record below we find that Mr. Christenson was not sent copies of the 
discovery and notices of deposition. If he had been served, why did he not get copies mailed 
to him? The earlier case file shows clearly that he was not sent a copy of the Motion for 
Summary Judgement in the case. If he had been served, why did he not get a copy mailed 
to him? He was not sent a copy of the Summary Judgment Order. If he had been served, 
why did he not get a copy mailed to him? 
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 1 1 le i ecoi d is clear I here is no basis for coi lcluding anything other thai i Mr. 
Christenson v\;i\ nni stTvnl n ih^ ruse 
III. A judgment entered against "Christensen" does not affect the rights of Richard 
A. Christenson. 
The rat . , * .W;*M. ,. ,v\ .instensen " .okmg u the phone 
c i , •• • - j' • * - * - "' listed i i ins to o \ er foi in: ( i) pages, 
and includes 25 "R." or "Rick" or "Richard Christensens."3 The incorrect spelling of a name 
in a pleading is material and cannot be dismissed as a "trivial" oversight, particularly where 
no servLi i oi ui.uvu >n that name for mv document in the case. 
C "p ** ^ 
the parties cuiicn*1, stand, Mi. Cim&ieiifcuii •* f nreiudio 
$1,850,000.00 if tl le 1934 judgment is not vacated. Further, the court never took si_r~ *J 
rectify tl le error, and it is only through the efforts of Mr Christenson that this probl* ••) is 
even being addi essed . :"!l1  s it ci in entlj stands, tl lis Cox n t cannot just re-spell the name of a 
defendant without substantial prejudice to Mr. Christenson 
The lown <. purl refusal t<> respell Mr. Christenson's name. This refusal leaves the 
status of the lower court decision ambiguous, Does the lower court intend, by its refusal to 
3There are also multiple listings, of hundreds oi names, for *\ nnstenso; 
"Christiansen", "Christiensen", and "Christison." All " hose name- :\rr wn'-
characters of matching the names in the earlier action 
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correct the spelling, to leave the judgment without effect as to Mr. Christenson? Or, rather, 
does the lower court by its refusal to vacate the judgment to leave the judgment with some 
effect as to Mr. Christenson? This ambiguity should be cleared through the decision of this 
appeals court, determining as a matter of law that the 1984 judgment (in the 1981 case) is 
inapplicable to Mr. Richard A. Christenson. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither Mr. "Christensen" nor Mr. Christenson was served with process in 1981. 
When we examine the case file, there is nothing that would suggest that either Mr. 
"Christensen" or Mr. Christenson was served or had notice of the underlying action. The 
record is clear. There is no return of service for Mr. Christenson nor for Mr. "Christensen". 
There is no certificate of mailing of any document showing either Mr. "Christensen" or Mr. 
Christenson was made a party to the earlier action. There was no service. 
Since Mr. Christenson was not served at all in the earlier action, the 1984 judgment, 
as to Mr. Christenson, must be vacated. The law is clear on this point. 
Mr. Christenson is not the same as Mr. "Christensen". Both are valid, common 
names. Even if the earlier action was intended to name Mr. Christenson, it was misspelled 
and did not succeed. The judgment is not applicable to appellant. 
14 
DATED this 27th day of May, i QQQ 
NELSO\. SNUFFER* 
C Denver Snuffer J 
Attorney^ for \ntV!!ant Richard A Chnstenson 
] 5 
ADDENDUM 
1. Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Orders from Page 326 to 329 of the Record. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
•OCEDUKE 
190 
nt for purposes of appeal. The time for 
from a judgment., tilled by a party's 
lost-judgment motion, starts to run on 
when the trial court enters its signed 
nying the motion- Gaiiardo v. Boiinder, 
816 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
gh captioned "Objections to the Pro-
idings, Conclusions and Judgment,* 
;'s post-trial motion was in substance 
jnder this rule, inasmuch as it asked 
:o aJter its Surfings and to amend its 
s and judgments: therefore, defen-
ion toiJed the time for fling a notice 
ntiJ this morion -^as denied. Reeves 
it, 915 P.2d 1072 'Utah Ct. App. 
? verdict made no award of general 
d was deficient in form, plaintiffs 
nand that the jury be sent back for 
erations, and her failure to object 
t at a bench conference regarding 
ess of the verdict constituted 
right to a new trial or to appeal 
ohn v. J.C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 
>ecial verdict failed to mention 
igard to one par t of a cause of 
3 plain tiff failed to raise this 
efore the jury was discharged, 
eemed waived and could not be 
ion for new trial. Ute-Cal Land 
;her, 605 R2d 1240 (Utah 1980), 
!onal Farmers"' Union Property 
ompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 R2d 
635 (1955); Holmes v. Nelson. 
26 P.2d 722 (1953); Howard v. 
L 2d 149. 356 P.2d 275 (I960); 
atz Real Estate. Inc., 15 Utah 
?98 (1964); Hanson v. General 
, 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 61 
g. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 
(1964); Porcupine Reservoir 
?ller Corp., 15* Utah 2d 318, 
4); Watson v. Anderson, 29 
3
.2d 1003 (1973); Nichols v. 
31 (Utah 1976); Edgar v. 
05 (Utah 1977); l ime Com. 
ihall, 575 R2d 701 (Utah 
Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 
• Pontiac, Lac. v. Osborne, 
tan 1981); Mulherin v. 
528 R2d 1301 (Utah 1981); 
Xty, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 
artland Cement Co. v. 
59 (Utah 1983): Nelson v. 
207 (Utah 1983); Golden 
mtas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 
y, 705 P.2d 1165 (Utah 
ified Washington County 
P2d 679 fUtah 1986); I 
P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); I 
0P.2d 131S iU:ah 1987); f 
R2d 1372 ;U:ahCt. App. 
Co. v. Schettier. 768 P.2d 
9); Parvzek v. Paryzek, i 
App. 1989): Allred v. 
ah Ct. App. 1992); Ong 
h Ave. Corp.. 350 P2d 
UTAH ffiJLES t}V CIVIL PROCEIJI TO, KIIIII hi) 
WW* 
'4|7(Utah 1993); Putvin v. Thompson, 878 P2d App. 1997); PDQ Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 329 
:T!78(Utah CtApp. 1994); Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Utah Adv R/»n 20 mtah Ct. Ann. 1997): PDQ 
ootids, 882 PM 650 Oltah 1994): Commercial 
^gijCarp. v. Siggard, 936 R2d 1105 (Utah Ct. 
t  dv. ep.  (Ut t. pp. );  
Lube Ctr., Inc. v.-Huber, 949 P.2d 792 (Utah, Ct. 
App. 1997). 
CO.! LATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2tL — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial 
u U to 14, 29 et sea., 187 to 19L 
CJ£- — S6 C J J - S - - V e w ^ ^ ^ 1 3 e I : sec-
115. 116. 122 to 127 
AX-R- — Consent as grsund of vacating 
j^o^ zBent, or granting new tnai. in civil czse, 
tiler expiration of term or time prescribed by 
juoxte or rules of court. 3 A.I,.R.3d 1191. 
propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion 
or comments by judge as to compromise or 
fettiement of civil case. 6 AJLR-2d 1457. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits 
in opposition to motion for new trial In civil 
case, 7AL.R.3d 1000. 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A L R.3d 335. 
Propriety and prejudicial erect of instruc-
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in 
which they are written, 10 A L R.3d 501. 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or pre-
mises in question, 11 A_L JL3d 918. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 
AJLR3d 1101. 
Absence of judge from courtroom, during trial 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor-
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 
-I LJLZd 126. • • -
Amendment, after expiration of time for Sl-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 AJL.-R.3d 845. 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
civil case where jury has been waived or not 
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 104L 
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
appeal, 38 A-LJUth 1170. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 AJJUth 747. 
Court reporter's death or disability prior to 
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
new trial, 57 A i J U t h 1049. 
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages 
alone new trial granted on ground of inade-
quacy of damages — modern cases, 5 AJLR.5th 
875. 
After-acquired evidence of employee's mis-
conduct as barring or limiting recovery in ac-
tion for wrongful discharge, 34 AJLR.5th 699. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
damages for personal injury to or death of 
seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness - • 
modern cases, 96 ALJL Fed. 541. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
ages for personal injury or death in actions; 
under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 
USCS §§ 51 et seq.) — modem, cases,, 97 A J R 
Fed. 189. 
.Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical, mistakes in judgments, orders or other par f:;s 
of the record and errors therein, arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of 
an appeal, such, mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed .in 
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5/ the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
o r
 a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons 
(D,(2), or(3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
Rule 60 UTAH KULES OF CIVIL PBOCEDOEE 
was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality, of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a-court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a. judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent acnon. 
(Amended effective April 1, 1998.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1998 
amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion 
the following: "(4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Ruie 
4(e; ann the defendant has failed to appear in 
said aeion-'This basis for a motion is not found 
in the federal rule. The committee concluded 
the ^an<» was ambiguous and possibly in con-
flict with rales permitting service by means 
other than personal service. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment deleted the former fourth ground for a 
motion in Subdivision (b), as described in the 
Advisory Committee Note above, and renum-
bered the grounds accordingly. 
Compiler's Notes- — This rule is similar to 
Rule 60, FJR.CJl 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"Any other reason justifying relief* 
—Dffanh judgment. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel 
—Lack of due process. 
—Merits of case. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Real party in interest. 
—Refund of fine after dismissal. 
Appeals-
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Court's discretion. 
Default judgment. 
Kffifyt of set-aside judgment. 
—Admissions. 
Farm of motion. 
Fraud. 
—Burden of proof. 
—-Divuiue action. 
Independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
—Divorce decree. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Motion distinguished. 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without notice. 
Inequity of prospective application. 
Jurisdiction. 
Mistake, inadvener.ee, surprise or excusable 
^?£iect. 
— Default judgment. 
Illness. 
Inconvenience. 
Meritorious. 
Merits of claim. 
Negligence of attorney. 
No claim for relief 
—Delayed motion for new triaL 
—Factual error. 
—Failure to file cost biH 
—Failure to file notice of appeal. . 
—Nanreceipt of notice and findings. 
—Trial courts discretion. 
—.I7n»Tfipl«vmPTt t rtrrjt jyyn jmtinr^ appeal . 
—Workmen's compensation appeal. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
—Burden of proof 
—Discretion not abused. 
Procedure. 
—Notice to parties. 
Res judicata. 
Reversal of judgment. 
—Invalidation of sale. 
Satisfaction, release or discharge. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
—Discharging representative of estate from 
further demand. 
—Erroneously included damages. 
—Prospective application of judgment. 
Timeliness of motion. 
—Confused mental condition of party. 
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution. 
—Fraud. 
—Invalid service. 
—Judicial error. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Migtalr* inadvertence and neglect. 
—Newly discovered evidence. 
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption. 
—"Reasonable time.* 
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion. 
—-Satisfaction. 
Unauthorized appearance. 
Void judgment. 
—Basis. 
—Lack of jurisdiction. 
Cited. 
•Any other reason justifying relief." 
Subdivision To A 7' embodies three require' 
ments: First, that the reason be one other than 
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6fc .„ 
second, that the reason justify relief; and thirdt •$ 
that the motion be made within a reasonable * 
UTAH 
')§ &*:'Lan*> v. South Cent. Utah TV 
*|0d-13O4 (Utah 1982); Richinn 
gjjpman & Sons, 817 R2d 382 OJ 
1991). Where a defendant's motion to s€ 
- ^ t based on Subdivisions (bXl) 
wj5 motion for a new trial claimed 1 
tiolated Rule 5(a) on several occa 
^riding defendant with a copy < 
thereby causing surprise, centerij 
tiffs failure to provide a copy of hi 
jununary judgment to defendant 
t^ter claimed was a clear showing 
pjaintifFs part, the trial court coi 
Iieved in denying defendants n 
fraud was not present in what coui 
gred a lapse in procedure by piaint: 
Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 (U 
1987). 
Defendants claim that he mis 
tered into an ill-advised stipulat 
fbUy understanding its consequen 
xectly characterized by trial court 
inadvertence, surprise or neglect u 
vision (bXl); because Subdivision (fc 
Subdivision (bX7) could not apply a 
be used to circumvent the three-i 
period. Rich ins v. Delbert Chipman 
R2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In an action against a county fi 
construction and maintenance of a 
the county was not entitled to i 
Subdivision 0>X7) because of a chi 
ernmental immunity law, since 
Court decision specifically stated tl 
relied on by the county did not cha 
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n,! 
(Utah Ct App. 1997). 
—Default judgment. 
It was not an abuse of discretion 
court to relieve a defendant from 
illow her to answer where it was 
ibe had mistakenly believed that si 
protected by a divorce decree and fc 
decree required her husband to be 
pation and defend the action for 
Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 R2d 
Trial judge did not abuse discreti 
i&g to set aside default judgment * 
dant asserted that he thought th 
was invalid anH therefore paid no 
it Board of Educ v. Cox, 14 Utah 
,R2d 806 (1963). 
v* Where any reasonable excuse if 
defaulting party, courts generally t 
panting relief from a default judgr 
* appears that to do so would result 
tial injustice to the adve: 
Westinghouse Elec Supply Co. 
v Ursen Contractor, 544 R2d 876 (I 
^-Subdivision 0>X7) did not appl: 
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 -' *here defendant husband sought t< 
•• 5*&ult judgment of divorce 5 'Vi IT 
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•jction to disturb the judgment. K< 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
a national association. 
Plaintiff. 
) ORDER VACATING PRIOR 
) ORDER OF JULY 29, 1998 
vs. 
RICHARD F. McKEEN, et al., 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C-81-6354 
) Judse J. Dennis Frederick 
The Court, after reviewing a Motion from proposed Intervenors Michels, conducting a 
telephone conference with Counsel Denver C. Snuffer. Jr. and Bruce Nelson, and being advised 
in the premises, enters the following order: 
1. The Order of July 29, 1998 is set aside, without prejudice. 
2. The parties may purse this matter further before this court in further proceedings 
before either the undersigned Judge or Judge David Young in the case pending before him 
known as Civil No. 960902187. 
i 
DATED this j f f 'P day of .1 
COURT: 
J. Dennis rrederick \ 
District Coun Juaee 
i 
/ 
APPROVED A& TO FORM. 
^--'Derive. r C^Snuffer, Jr. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am employeUxbvtfie office of Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle. P.C. and 
that I caused to either be placed in the Unkeo^^tes mail, first class, postage prepaid: faxed: 
and/or hand-delivered; a true and correct copy of th©>fjoregoing ORDER VACATING 
JUDGMENT AGAINST RICHARETA. "CHRISTENSEN^to'the following: 
Brace J. Nelson 
NELSON RASMUSSEN 
215 South State. SujjrWO 
Sait Lake Ciry. UT84111 
CHRISTENSEN 
Sent via?" 
Mail 
Facsimile 
Hand-delivery 
Brace J. Nelson (2380) 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
215 South State, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8400 
Attorneys for Michels (Intervenors) 
^ S S f e * * 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a 
national association, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD F. MCKEEN, et al. 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING 
RENEWED MOTION TO VACATE 
JUDGMENT OF RICHARD A. 
CHRISTENSON 
Civil No. C-S1-6354 
Judse J. Dennis Frederick 
The Court, having received a Notice to Submit for Decision pursuant to the Code of 
Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501 on the matter of Defendant Richard A Christenson's 
Renewed Motion to Vacate Judgment of Richard A Christenson dated September 10. 1998. and 
having read and considered the Memorandum of points and authorities filed in support of said 
Motion by Defendant, the Objection to said Motion filed by Uwe Michel, Annette Michel, Ullrich 
Michel and Corolla Michel (hereinafter "Michel") as Intervenors in this matter and the 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum, the Coun now hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES: 
1. Defendant Richard A Christenson's Motion to Vacate Judgment is DENIED for 
the reasons set forth in the opposite Memorandum submitted by Michel. 
teft£r,1998. 
BY" 
SO ORDERED this J^Tday of. 
Approved as to form: 
CJQea^A^iiBfey 
Attornev foriJDefendant Christenson 
o 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am employed by the office of Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, P.C. 
and that I caused to either be placed in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid; 
faxed; and/or hand-delivered; a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF to the following: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
215 South State, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Sent via: 
X Mail 
Facsimile 
Hand-delivery 
r-b^ DATED this 2-1- day of May, 1999. 
